Rethinking the US nuclear triad
Por: Watson, Darius E
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Colaborador(es): Kai He
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Tipo de material:
ArtículoDescripción: 11, 4 (winter 2017) :134-150.Tema(s): GUERRA NUCLEAR| Tipo de ítem | Ubicación actual | Signatura | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articulo de Revista
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Biblioteca | US.SS/4/2017 (Navegar estantería) | Disponible |
For over 50 years, the structure of the US nuclear triad has remained the same. Relying on strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic misiles, and submarine-launched ballistic misiles, the United States has sought to deter strategies threats from a variety of sources. The current threat environment, however, is radically different from what was being considered when the triad was created. From the continued evolution of terrorism to the increasing threat of cyberattacks, both the nature of the threats facing the United States and the deterrence frameworks necessary to counter them have changed. The United States needs to critically reassess the current triad with an eye toward eliminating redundant or potentially ineffective delivery systems such as the strategic nuclear bomber

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