Why international order in cyberspace is not inevitable
Por: Mazanec, Brian M
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ArtículoDescripción: 9, 2 (summer 2015) : 78-98.Tema(s): CIBERESPACIO| Tipo de ítem | Ubicación actual | Signatura | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
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Biblioteca | US.SS/2/2015 (Navegar estantería) | Disponible |
James Forsyth and Billy Pope argue that great powers will inevitably cooperate and establish rules, norms, and standards for cyberspace. The foundation of their argument is that such an outcome is inevitable because "great powers will have no choice but to cooperate . . . [to] soften the harsh effects of multipolarity and oligopolistic competition." While it is true that increased competition may create incentives for cooperation on constraining norms, the history of norm evolution for other emerging-technology weapons indicates that such an outcome is unlikely. Forsyth and Pope postulate that the advent of cyberwarfare poses such a range of challenges to states that constraining norms will inevitably take root. On the contrary, norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons leads one to conclude that constraining norms for cyberwarfare will face many challenges and may never successfully emerge.

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