01441nab a22002537a 450000100060000000300110000600500170001700600190003400800410005304000390009408200170013310000220015024500360017230000330020852007960024165000190103765000200105665000220107665000090109865000090110765100190111670000110113577300410114653460CL-SaANEPE20211029004350.0a||||| |||| 00| 0 160316t2017    xx ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aCL-SaANEPEcCL-SaANEPEdCL-SaANEPE  aUS.SS/4/2017  aWatson, Darius E.10aRethinking the US nuclear triad  a11, 4 (winter 2017) :134-150  aFor over 50 years, the structure of the US nuclear triad has remained the same. Relying on strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic misiles, and submarine-launched ballistic misiles, the United States has sought to deter strategies threats from a variety of sources. The current threat environment, however, is radically different from what was being considered when the triad was created. From the continued evolution of terrorism to the increasing threat of cyberattacks, both the nature of the threats facing the United States and the deterrence frameworks necessary to counter them have changed. The United States needs to critically reassess the current triad with an eye toward eliminating redundant or potentially ineffective delivery systems such as the strategic nuclear bomber17aGUERRA NUCLEAR17aARMAS NUCLEARES17aMISILES NUCLEARES17aICBM17aSLBM17aESTADOS UNIDOS  aKai He0 tStrategic Studies Quarterly.w020904