02385nab a22003377a 4500 55597 55597 55597 CL-SaANEPE 20211029005722.0 a||||| |||| 00| 0 160316t2019 xx ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d CL-SaANEPE CL-SaANEPE CL-SaANEPE US.SS/2/2019 Anderson, Justin V. 48890 The INF treaty: a spectacular, inflexible, time-bund success 13, 2 (summer 2019) :90-122 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was a triumph of US and NATO nuclear deterrence and diplomatic strategies, bringing Moscow to the negotiating table and leading both superpowers to agree to completely and verifiably dismantle two classes (shorter-range [500-1,000 km] and intermediate range [1,000-5,500 km]) of nuclear-capable, ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles. Three decades later, the treaty is in peril, with the United States announcing in February 2019 its intent to withdraw if the Russian Federation does not dismantle its treatyviolating SSC-8 missile. While Russia's decision to iolate the treaty catalyzed the present crisis, the context within which the treaty was negotiated has significantly changed since the late 1980s. The article discusses how these changes-the growth in shorter-range and intermediate-range (IRBM) missile arsenals in third states, the breakdown in the Cold War consensus on arms control, and the changing dynamics of US-NATO extended deterrence and assurance-led first Moscow and then Washington to reevaluate the merit of the INF Treaty. It concludes that the treaty's relative rigidity may play a key role in its undoing and suggests that future arms control negotiations develop more flexible and resilient mechanisms of review, dispute resolution, and verification. INF 35895 FUERZAS NUCLEARES 34318 FUERZAS NUCLEARES INTERMEDIAS 34319 DISUASION NUCLEAR 32246 MISILES BALISTICOS 38349 CONTROL DE ARMAS 30069 TRATADOS 44950 GOBIERNO TRUMP 47161 SIGLO XXI 43524 46215 ESTADOS UNIDOS 48891 Nelson, Amy J. Strategic Studies Quarterly. 020904 REVA ddc OSS20190904