01786nab a22002657a 4500 55921 55921 55921 CL-SaANEPE 20211029005927.0 a||||| |||| 00| 0 160316t2015 xx ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d CL-SaANEPE CL-SaANEPE CL-SaANEPE US.SS/4/2015 Geist, Edward 49112 Deterrence stability in the cyber age 9, 4 (winter 2015) : 44-61 Technical and operational realities make it prohibitively difficult to adapt a Cold War paradigm of "deterrence stability" to the new domain of cyber warfare. Information quality problems are likely to forestall the development of a cyber equivalent of the strategic exchange models that assessed deterrence stability during the Cold War. Since cyberspace is not firmly connected to geographic space the way other domains are, it makes modeling extremely difficult as well as muddles neat conceptual distinctions between "counterforce" (military) and "countervalue" (civilian) targets. These obstacles seriously complicate U.S. planning for a credible cyber "assured response," and also present substantial challenges to potential adversaries contemplating cyber attacks against U.S. interests. To create a maximally effective deterrent against cyber threats, the United States should seek to maximize the challenges for possible opponents by creating a cyber "strategy of technology" emphasizing resilience, denial, and offensive capabilities. GUERRA CIBERNETICA 35042 DISUASION 32240 ERA DE LA INFORMACION 32989 CIBERESPACIO 28871 46215 ESTADOS UNIDOS Strategic Studies Quarterly. 020904 REVA ddc OSS20191022 0 0 ddc 0 0 BC BC 2019-10-22 US.SS/4/2015 2019-10-22 2019-10-22 REVA