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040 _aCL-SaANEPE
_cCL-SaANEPE
_dCL-SaANEPE
100 1 _aArriola, Leonardo
082 _aUS.WP/2/2013
245 1 0 _aCapital and opposition in Africa :
_bcoalition building in multiethnic societies.
300 _aVol. 65, nro. 2 (april 2013), p. 233-272
520 _aUnder what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies from electoral coalition? In Africa's patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business - the largest potential funder of oposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent's pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binominal logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business - as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector - significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed
590 _aBIBLIOTECA NOVEDADES 2013/6
650 4 _a1990 2005
650 4 _aCIENCIA POLITICA
650 4 _aCOALICIONES POLITICAS
650 4 _aECONOMIA POLITICA
650 4 _aFINANCIAMIENTO
650 4 _aFINANCIAMIENTO POLITICO
650 4 _aOPOSICION
650 4 _aPOLITICA
650 4 _aSIGLO XX
650 4 _aSIGLO XXI
651 4 _aAFRICA
773 0 _tWorld Politics.
_w020492
942 _cREVA
945 _aoss20130904
999 _c49235
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